

INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS:  
A DECISION FRAMEWORK

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Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: A DECISION FRAMEWORK, by  
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How should political and military institutions and their leaders think about interventions in intrastate conflicts and civil wars? Moreover, what intervention variables are used to evaluate and implement a different intervention approach during a civil war?

Comprehensive studies on third-party intervention and civil wars have focused on if, when, and why to intervene; type of intervention; and intervention effects on civil war processes. Additional scholarship has focused on the role of foreign powers, foreign fighters, and violent extremist organizations and their effects on conflict management and resolution efforts. However, there has not been an intervention framework that accounts for conflict theories in relation to each other over a period of time. I propose a theoretic framework that provides an intervention analyst evaluative variables to assess the effectiveness of an intervention approach over the course of a civil war.

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If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.

— Sir Isaac Newton

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	ix
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
Research Questions .....	1
Defining Intervention.....	2
Defining Civil War .....	3
Aim of Research .....	5
Scope of Research.....	5
Trajectory of Research.....	6
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	7
Third Party Intervention in Civil Wars .....	7
Political Aims and Desired Outcomes .....	8
Theory: Choosing to Intervene (Decision Framework) .....	8
Theory: Choosing an Intervention Option (Decision Framework) .....	9
Theory: War Aims and War Outcomes .....	10
Theory: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage .....	11
Theory: Peacekeeping: The Duration of Peace After Civil War .....	11
Conflict Dynamics .....	12
Theory: Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts .....	12
Theory: Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process .....	12
Theory: External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars.....	13
Theory: The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome.....	13
Theory: Diplomatic Interventions and Civil Wars.....	14
Theory: Economic Sanctions and Civil Conflicts.....	15
Theory: Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises .....	15
Theories: Barriers to Conflict Management and Resolution .....	17
Civil War Dynamics .....	17
Collective Action Problems .....	19
Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies .....	20
Theory: Use of Statecraft .....	20
Theory: Transnational Theory .....	21

Theory: An Actor-Centric Approach .....	22
Theory: The Effectiveness of Official and Non-official Diplomacy .....	23
Theory: Outsider-Neutral, Insider-Partial .....	23
Theory: Mediators and Resolution.....	25
Theory: Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity.....	26
Theory: Sabotaging the Peace.....	27
Theory: Securing the Peace .....	27
Summary .....	28
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	29
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .....	31
Intervention Framework .....	32
Pre-Intervention Environment .....	33
Political Aims and Desired Outcomes .....	34
Political Considerations: National Interests.....	34
Political Considerations: Political Costs and Benefits.....	35
Political Considerations: Intervention Capabilities and Opportunity .....	35
Political Considerations: Political Willingness and Resolve.....	36
Desired Conflict Outcome: Durable Peace Conditions .....	37
Type of Intervention: Third-Party Intervention Effects.....	38
Type of Intervention: Multilateral and Combined Efforts.....	41
Conflict Dynamics: Underlying Conflict Issues .....	42
Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Political Leadership .....	42
Conflict Environment.....	44
Political Aims and Desired Outcomes .....	44
Political Considerations .....	44
Desired Conflict Outcome: Institutional Capacity.....	45
Conflict Dynamics: Conflict Issues .....	45
Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Political Participants .....	46
Post Conflict Environment.....	47
Political Aims and Desired Outcomes .....	47
Political Considerations .....	47
Desired Conflict Outcome: Durable Peace Conditions .....	48
Conflict Dynamics: Justice and Reconciliation .....	49
Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Resolution Participants .....	50
State Capacity .....	50
Security Apparatus.....	50
Summary .....	51
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	53

Conclusions.....	53
Recommendations.....	53
Opportunity for Future Research .....	54
REFERENCE LIST .....	56



## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Utility of Intervention or Non-intervention .....	9
Figure 2. Typology of Political Objectives .....	11
Figure 3. Mediation Outcome .....	15
Figure 4. Coercion Spectrum.....	21
Figure 5. Factors Leading to High Level, Formal Intervention .....	22
Figure 6. Neutrality-Based Model.....	24
Figure 7. Trust-Based Model.....	25
Figure 8. Intervention Framework.....	32
Figure 9. Pre-Intervention Environment .....	33
Figure 10. Third-Party Intervention Effects .....	39
Figure 11. Conflict Environment.....	44
Figure 12. Post Conflict Environment.....	47

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, intrastate conflict management and conflict resolution in the form of intervention and engagement have emerged as leading topics of research in academia, foreign policy, international theory, international relations, and comparative politics. Persistent regional and domestic internal armed conflicts and civil wars have continued to pressure the international community to intervene. Hostilities such as Zaire's insurrection in the late 1960s (Regan 2000a, 90), Yugoslavia's 1990s breakup and communal conflict in Bosnia, Rwanda's genocidal and sectarian violence in 1990-1994, Somalia's failed government and impending humanitarian crisis in the early 1990s, and Kosovo's ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians in the late 1990s (Nye 2007, 165) have affected domestic and international politics. Such conflicts have prompted intergovernmental organizations and states to enact responsive, policy-driven diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian institutions.

### Research Questions

How should political and military institutions and their leaders think about interventions in intrastate conflicts and civil wars? Moreover, what intervention variables are used to evaluate and implement a different approach? Comprehensive studies on third-party intervention and civil wars have focused on if, when, and why to intervene; type of intervention; and intervention effects on civil war processes. Civil war processes refer to duration of hostilities and type of outcome. Additional scholarship has focused on the role of foreign powers, foreign fighters, and violent extremist organizations and their

effects on conflict management and resolution efforts. Scholars have presented numerous theories to identify and examine factors and conditions relative to intrastate conflicts and third-party interventions. However, there has not been an intervention framework that accounts for theories in relation to each other. I propose a theoretic framework that provides an intervention analyst evaluative variables to assess the effectiveness of an intervention approach.

There are a number of factors taken into consideration when deciding if, when, and why to intervene. Domestic and international politics influence policy and decision makers. National interests are considered. Analysts calculate material and human costs of an intervention approach. Benefits of intervention or non-intervention are discussed. Policy and decision makers discuss on whose behalf to intervene, the government or the opposition. They also contend with previous intervention strategies and their results. I argue that an intervention framework can address these concerns not only during pre-intervention phases, but throughout the conflict as well.

### Defining Intervention

At its core, intervention encompasses those actions foreign powers or external actors take to influence the domestic and internal affairs of sovereign states. Often intervention is a product of international or regional treaties, brokered alliances or coalitions, or national security or economic interests. Intervention can occur along a coercion spectrum between low coercion which connotes high local choice, and high coercion which connotes low local choice. Intervention includes the employment of soft power tactics, hard power tactics, or any combination of tactics (Nye 2007, 162-163).

Interventions take the form of diplomacy, economic aid, assistance, and sanctions, or the threat or use of military force (Regan 2000a, 91).

The reasons to intervene range from geostrategic and geopolitical interests to egregious human rights violations to humanitarian needs. Additionally, once an intervention strategy has been chosen, Rory Stewart contends that it must judiciously operate along a nonintervention-intervention-overintervention continuum (Stewart 2011, xvi). He further states that interveners must understand not only their capabilities, but also their limitations (Stewart 2011, xiii). For the purposes of this study, analysis and findings will focus on those third-party interventions intended to “affect the balance of power between the government and opposition forces” and end the fighting between political participants (Regan 1998, 757).

### Defining Civil War

Broadly, civil wars are defined by their internality within a sovereign state, their participants, fatality rate, and the degree of effective resistance by opposing participants. A key distinction of civil wars from other internal conflicts or rebellions is that one of the warring participants at the onset of hostilities is the national government and its military counterpart (Sarkees 2010). For the purposes of this paper, intrastate conflict and civil war will be used interchangeably.

Civil war scholars have identified a number of political, economic, social, historical, and geographical variables as civil war determinants that heavily influence intervention decisions. Zachariah Mampilly states inequality, discrimination, and repression can lead to civil conflict (Lynch et al. 2014). Stathis Kalyvas provides a rather exhaustive list of pre-war variables that includes level of economic development, ethnic

heterogeneity, presence of natural resources, undemocratic neighbors, and the rate of infant mortalities (Kalyvas 2007, 418).

Barbara Walter suggests that high levels of insecurity, fear, and uncertainty may lead to conflict. She terms this the security dilemma. Walter finds that these security dilemmas encourage groups to war despite nonaggressive aims. She further elaborates that failing/ed governments, geographic isolation and vulnerability, the balance of power and the distribution of resources, and disarmament trigger such security dilemmas (Walter and Snyder 1999, 4).

There are other variables that contribute to starting a conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler focus on impoverished economic conditions of developing countries as conflict determinants. Essentially they focus on “what conditions make rebellions financially viable” (Collier and Sambanis 2005, xiv). Interestingly, James Fearon and David Laitin discount ethnicity as a conflict determinant. Instead, they point to those “conditions that favor insurgency as poverty, political instability, rough terrain, and large populations” as conflict determinants (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). These variables must be considered when developing a strategy for conflict management and resolution.

Finally, with respect to civil wars, scholars have attempted to categorize civil wars in terms of conventional or irregular based on military asymmetries and tactics employed. Extracting directly from Kalyvas’ civil war terminology and studies, “conventional civil wars emerge either out of failed military coups or secession attempts; irregular civil wars result from insurgencies; and symmetric non-conventional civil wars follow a process of state implosion” (Kalyvas 2007, 428). Although military asymmetries and tactics employed by warring parties affect conflict duration and outcome, it is beyond

the scope this study. Therefore, when referring to intrastate conflict or civil war, I make no effort to distinguish between conventional, irregular, or symmetric non-conventional.

### Aim of Research

The purpose of this study is to provide policy-relevant insight for the U.S. policymakers, the international community, and those institutions responsible for determining whether or not to intervene in intrastate conflicts or civil wars. This research is not intended to promote one type of intervention over another or any combination of intervention efforts for that matter. Also, this study is not intended to discount previous frameworks as ineffective. Instead, this study emphasizes temporal analysis and highlights civil war conditions that influence the effectiveness of intervention strategies over the course of a conflict.

Through abductive reasoning, I integrate large bodies of scholarship concerning foreign intervention into an assessment of intrastate conflicts. I propose an analytical framework consisting of three intervention periods—pre-intervention, conflict, and post conflict. Each period consists of three aggregate themes - political aims and desired outcomes; conflict dynamics; and characteristics, motivations, and tendencies of actors.

### Scope of Research

The scope of this study is limited to conflict theory scholarship. International relations subsume numerous schools of thought regarding conflict management and resolution strategies in intrastate conflicts. These include realist thoughts, idealism, realpolitik, and responsibility to protect. However, although their ideas and concepts underlay the frameworks, models, and theories presented, intervention policy and its

place within international relations is not the focus of this study. Thus, I will not be addressing the schools of thought in any specificity.

### Trajectory of Research

Chapter 2 identifies an aggregation gap in the literature regarding third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts. This chapter will review theories pertaining to pre-intervention conditions, civil war dynamics, intervention effects on civil war processes, and post conflict intervention considerations. Chapter 2 also provides scholarship regarding those factors that contribute as barriers to effective conflict management and resolution. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used, that being abductive reasoning. In chapter 4 I propose an intervention framework that integrates the theories, frameworks, and models presented during the literature review.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to identify an aggregation gap in the literature on third-party intervention in civil wars. There is a wealth of literature addressing third-party intervention, its effects on civil war processes, and factors precluding effective conflict management and resolution. Scholars have developed frameworks to decide if, when, and why to intervene. Others have studied intervention types, whether diplomatic, economic, or military, and how they affect conflict duration and outcome. A large body of literature also addresses the effectiveness and sustainability of post conflict peace agreements. However, no scholar has integrated these theories into a comprehensive intervention framework that takes into account pre-intervention decision making and the aggregate effects of third-party intervention during, and post conflict.

This chapter presents the dominant third-party intervention theories concerning decisions to intervene and type of intervention chosen, conflict variables and dynamics, and the durability of post conflict resolution terms. The chapter begins with an overview of third-party intervention in civil wars and is followed by conflict theories. The theories are grouped into three categories—political aims and desired outcomes; conflict dynamics; and characteristics, motivations, and tendencies of actors. These categories are subcomponents of a proposed intervention framework offered in chapter 4.

#### Third Party Intervention in Civil Wars

Intrastate conflicts have engrossed policymakers worldwide as these conflicts have threatened global security and national interests and have stalled economic



development. Intervention proponents argue that it is the responsibility of the states to “provide for their own security and preserve their own survival” (Brown 2007, 40). Due to the absence of an international authority capable of global governance and security, intrastate conflicts are argued to fall within the purview of the international community and developed countries (Mack 2007, 523; Wedgwood 2007, 585). Therefore, if a state fails to meet its governance and security responsibilities, the international community has the responsibility to respond.

Joseph Nye has found that although conservative governments have been resistant, globalization has created a sense of international interdependence due to its establishment of global networks—political, military, economic, and to some degree social (Nye 2007, 209-213). Additionally, through the United Nations 2005 Responsibility to Protect resolution, members of the international community maintain their support of intervention in response to “genocidal actions, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing” (Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention on Genocide 2012). Thus, when deciding if, when, and why to intervene, policymakers contend with conflicting theories of intervention.

### Political Aims and Desired Outcomes

#### Theory: Choosing to Intervene (Decision Framework)

Patrick Regan posits the question under what conditions should intervention be considered. He challenges the dominant theories of intervening when national interests are at stake, when domestic politics support intervention, or when foreign policy dictates intervention. He discusses the associative dynamics of each and finds them to be intertwined. He finds that constraints imposed by domestic and international policies

influence the decision to intervene. Regan further suggests that political leaders are unlikely to advocate for intervention in highly intense conflicts yet are likely to decide to intervene in conflict with a significant humanitarian crisis (Regan 1998, 757).

Regan proposes a decision theoretic framework to understand under what conditions policymakers tend to advocate for intervention. His framework offers a model analyzing political costs, expected utilities over outcomes, and estimates of likely intervention success (see figure 1) (Regan 1998, 761).

$EU_n = q(U_s) + (1-q)(U_c) - \sum C_n$ <p style="text-align: center;">and</p> $EU_i = p(U_{sw}) + (1-p)(U_f) - \sum C_i$	$EU_n$ = expected utility of not intervening $q$ = probability that the conflict will be settled without outside influence $U_s$ = the utility to the potential intervener from a successful settlement without intervention $U_c$ = the utility of continued fighting without an intervention $\sum C_n$ = sum of cost of not intervening
	$EU_i$ = expected utility from an intervention $p$ = decision maker's subjective probability that the intervention will result in a successful outcome $U_{sw}$ = the utility of success with an intervention $U_f$ = the utility of a continuation of the fighting after an unsuccessful intervention $\sum C_i$ = sum of cost of intervening

Figure 1. Utility of Intervention or Non-intervention

Source: Patrick M. Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 60, no. 3 (August 1998): 761.

#### Theory: Choosing an Intervention Option (Decision Framework)

In a 2000 *Journal of Conflict Resolution* article, Regan turns to identifying under what conditions certain intervention strategies are chosen (Regan 2000a, 90). Similar to his previous studies (Regan 1998), he finds that domestic and international politics influence the type of intervention policy chosen. Regan proffers a two-part analytical decision framework. He first suggests analyzing political risks and capabilities. Risks

“refer to the vulnerabilities faced as a result of action or inaction in response to a civil conflict”<sup>1</sup> (Regan 2000a, 92). Capabilities refer to policies and options, resources, and alliances available to the potential intervener<sup>2</sup> (Regan 2000a, 93). Secondly, based off risk and capability estimates, he proposes evaluating the willingness of political leadership and the opportunity to intervene.

### Theory: War Aims and War Outcomes

Addressing why strong states lose limited wars, Patricia Sullivan studies the nature of a strong state’s war aims. She measures the effect of resolve (cost tolerance) versus the effect of military strength (ability to use brute force). She argues that “the effect of military strength and resolve on war outcomes varies based on the political objective” (Sullivan 2009, 496). Sullivan further “argues that strong states are more likely to underestimate the cost of victory and the impact of resolve” (Sullivan 2009, 496). The study focuses on political objectives pursued through the use of military force and level of coercion (see figure 2).

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<sup>1</sup>Risks “are a function of the international political ramifications of a civil conflict and the domestic implications of a particular policy choice” (Regan 2000a, 92).

<sup>2</sup>Capabilities are a function of geostrategic and geopolitical conditions and the relative resource strength of potential intervening state inclusive of “geographic location, trade patterns, and characteristics of the international system” (Regan 2000a, 93).




Figure 2. Typology of Political Objectives

Source: Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 3 (June 2007): 504.

### Theory: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage

Suzanne Werner addresses political aims over the course of a conflict focusing on why some wars end in extreme political or military terms while others return to relative status quo. She attempts to find under what conditions belligerents participate and under what settlement terms belligerents agree to in order to end hostilities. She argues that the original aims of belligerents affect their wartime bargaining leverage. Finding that settlement terms are affected by original aims, Werner concludes that “belligerents generally use bargaining leverage to demand as much as possible and to concede as little as possible” (Werner 1998, 321).

### Theory: Peacekeeping: The Duration of Peace After Civil War

Virginia Fortna examines international interventions following civil wars and the durability of peace by posing the question: does peacekeeping work? First, Fortna addresses when and where peacekeeping missions deploy. UN peacekeepers are unlikely to deploy in support of civil wars that end in military victory. However, peacekeeping is much more likely following negotiated settlements (Fortna 2004, 278). Then she

examines the effectiveness of peacekeeping in relation to peace durability. Overall, Fortna argues that peacekeeping efforts help to maintain peace and prevent recurrent fighting. However, she also finds that peacekeeping is much harder in civil wars where identity is central to the conflict and the conflict has resulted in a very high death toll (Fortna 2004, 287).

### Conflict Dynamics

#### Theory: Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts

Regan examines whether third-party interventions shorten or lengthen the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. He argues that third party interventions tend to lengthen a conflict's duration rather than shorten. Three units of analysis drive his research: unilateral interventions on behalf of the government or opposition, use of military force, and conflicts that spark counterinterventions. In general, Regan finds that most intervention efforts prolong the conflict's expected duration, specifically unilateral interventions. He also finds that military or economic interventions on their own are ineffective conflict management tools (Regan 2002, 56, 71).

#### Theory: Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process

In answering the question of the effect third-party interventions have on the evolution of civil wars, Dylan Balch-Lindsay et al. analyzed civil war outcomes in relation to civil war duration. They argue that third-party intervention affects civil war duration and outcome differently based on intervening on behalf of the government or opposition. Their study focused on three civil war outcomes and how they compete with

each other: military victory by the government, military victory by the opposition group, and negotiated settlement (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008, 345). In doing so, they examined third-party intervention as intervention on behalf of the government, intervention on behalf of the opposition, and simultaneous interventions on behalf of the government and opposition (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008, 349).

#### Theory: External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars

Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis examine two factors, external interventions and ethnic fragmentation, and how they influence the duration of a civil war. The authors base their theory on the premise that a civil war's termination depends on the balance of military capability between the primary warring actors, the government and the rebels (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 1). They argue that ethnic fractionalization and external interventions are typically associated with prolonged conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 14-15).

#### Theory: The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome

Addressing the question of what goes into the calculations of the government or the rebels to decide to end or continue hostilities, Karel DeRouen and David Sobek examine the dynamics of civil war and its potential outcomes: government or rebel victory, truce, or treaty (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, 303). They focus on the role of state capacity and the rebels with the understanding that both make decisions with specific outcomes in mind. DeRouen and Sobek find that effective governing and security apparatuses undermine rebel victory. However, regime type and government army size

have minimal influence on government victory and appear unrelated to negotiated settlements (DeRouen and Sobek 2004, 317).

### Theory: Diplomatic Interventions and Civil Wars

Beginning with the fact that external actors matter, Regan et al. examine when, how, and under what conditions diplomatic conflict management efforts are effective. They argue that external diplomatic efforts facilitate the termination of internal conflicts (Regan et al. 2009, 135). Operating on the premise that external actors function in an informationally-asymmetric environment, they examine third-party attempts at manipulating structural changes and altering information asymmetries.<sup>3</sup> They also measure the effects of mediator biases, preferences, and rank on mediation outcomes.<sup>4</sup> Mediation outcomes were categorized as ceasefires, partial settlements, full settlements, or failures (conflict persists). Ultimately, they find that most mediations result in a change in the behavior of political participants (Regan et al. 2009, 140) with only 4 percent resulting in failure (see figure 3). Regarding the mediator's preferences or rank, results suggest it matters, but the authors suggest further research regarding its effects. Lastly, Regan et al. highlight noticable intervention policy trends. They find that coercion and unilateral efforts are giving way to persuasion and multilateral efforts respectively.

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<sup>3</sup>Structural changes refer to those changes made to the relationships of warring parties and the "information they have about others' preferences and capabilities" (Regan et al. 2009, 137).

<sup>4</sup>Regan et al. defines rank in terms of "level of executive authority the mediator would have over the resources of the state: (1) head of state or leader of an international organization, (2) representative of a state or international organization, and (3) private citizen or member of a non-governmental organization" (Regan et al. 2009, 141).




Figure 3. Mediation Outcome

Source: Patrick M. Regan et al., "Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 1 (January 2009): 141.

#### Theory: Economic Sanctions and Civil Conflicts

Abel Escribà-Folch analyzes different types of economic sanctions imposed by one country, a coalition of countries, or by an international organization and its effects on civil war duration and outcome (Escribà-Folch 2010, 129). He concludes that economic sanctions are statistically associated with shorter intrastate conflicts. He finds that the type of intervener minimally affects conflict duration, but significantly influences the type of outcome (Escribà-Folch 2010, 140).

#### Theory: Military Intervention Decisions Regarding Humanitarian Crises

Numerous studies find military interventions in intrastate conflicts to be ineffective and do little to shorten the conflict or influence an outcome (Regan 2002; Escribà-Folch 2010). However, when a humanitarian crisis is impending or worsening,



the likelihood of military intervention increases (Regan 1998; Nye 2007; Stewart 2011). With the understanding that domestic politics significantly influence intervention policies (Regan 1998; Regan 2000b), William Boettcher examines those factors that affect public support for U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises.<sup>5</sup> More specifically, he examines the role of framing by decision-makers in shaping public opinion.<sup>6</sup> Boettcher posits that the concept of framing could be used by political leaders or the media to sway the public or opposition toward a specific humanitarian intervention (Boettcher 2004, 332-333).

Generally, Boettcher finds the public supportive of past military interventions. Yet, he identified three factors as having significant impact on public support for humanitarian crises: framing of intervention in terms of gains and losses, casualty sensitivity, and religion of experiment participant. When an intervention is framed in terms of gains or losses, data suggests public support for perceived gains or opposition if costs are emphasized. In regards to casualty sensitivity, research suggests that public opposition to military intervention will significantly increase if “the ratio of American lives lost is more than 1 to 10.” Finally, religiosity by itself produced general support for military intervention despite target population’s religion (Boettcher 2004, 348).

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<sup>5</sup>For his study, Boettcher defines military intervention in humanitarian crisis “as those interventions that involve the use or threaten the use of military forces by one or more outside states into the affairs of another state with the intent to relieve grave human suffering. Such suffering may involve the systematic abuse of basic human rights or the general breakdown of a central government” (Boettcher 2004, 332).

<sup>6</sup>“The concept of framing is the decision-maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice” (Boettcher 2004, 334).

## Theories: Barriers to Conflict Management and Resolution

### Civil War Dynamics

Over the course of any civil war, conflict management and resolution strategies face a number of civil war conditions and collective action problems that act as barriers. External actors and foreign fighters, asymmetric power, insecurity and fear, credibility and committal issues, political violence, and rebel fractionalization all affect intervention efforts. David Cunningham suggests that with foreign involvement come foreign preferences and interests that may not be that of the incumbent, insurgent, or other external actors. Their pursuit of different aims could result in the derailment or delay of a negotiated settlement (D. Cunningham 2013, 26).

Scholars also note the importance of ownership and local pride of targeted country and population. They elaborate that although civil wars have distal impacts, conflict management and resolution strategies must be locally driven and accepted. When not driven by local political participants, negotiated settlements contend with the lack of multipartied acceptance, committal issues, and long term sustainability (Lynch et al. 2014).

In his work, the Logic of Violence in Civil War, Kalyvas provides a five-zone measure of political violence and control. Put briefly, the zoned template identifies areas of incumbent or insurgent control and whether or not those zones will suffer from indiscriminate or selective violence. Essentially, Kalyvas posits the following: “(1) the higher the level of an actor’s control, the less likely it is that this actor will resort to violence, selective or indiscriminate; (2) the lower the level of an actor’s control, the less likely that this actor will resort to selective violence and the more likely its violence, if

any, will be indiscriminate; (3) under fragmented control, violence will be exercised primarily by the political actor enjoying a control advantage; and (4) parity of control between the actors is likely to produce no selective violence by any of the actors” (Kalyvas 2006, 204).

Furthermore, within these zones varying degrees of governance and civil society exist. As Zachariah Mampilly and Steve Heydemann suggest, political actors are motivated to establish governing apparatuses and provide essential services (Lynch et al. 2014). This includes the opposition and their factions. Thus, civilians in these areas experience a degree of security and normality.

Substantial obstacles hampering conflict management and resolution strategies are group fractionalization and alliance shifting. The dynamics of group fragmentation have stymied conflict intervention efforts over the years. Driven by the thought of establishing an enduring and constructive peace settlement, foreign interveners assume that the benefits of peace are sufficient conditions desired by a conflict’s warring parties, political stakeholders, and population (Toft 2010, 1). However, scholarship contends that rebel group fragmentation, distribution of power, infighting, lack of political cohesion, and credibility and committal problems increase the severity and duration of hostilities and severely inhibit negotiation efforts (Lynch et al. 2014).

Elbadawi and Sambanis claim that ethnic fractionalization of a society inhibits rebel cooperation and cohesion, contributing to the length of a civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, 14). Kathleen Cunningham highlights that divisive rebel groups suffer from substantial credibility problems (K. G. Cunningham 2013, 34). Paul Staniland claims that fragmented groups “lacking central cohesion or local control tend to be

quickly marginalized and difficult to reform” (Staniland 2013, 37). Wendy Pearlman states that although opposition parties share the same short-term goal of “overthrowing a system of political rule, existing and emerging divisions on strategy, ideology, and the post-conflict distribution of political power” dissuade the international intervention (Pearlman 2013, 40). Christia argues that fractionalizing occurs in order to “win the war and maximize one’s share of postwar political control.” Christia further argues that these newly formed or renewed alliances suffer from commitment problems (Christia 2012, 32), a finding also supported by Walter’s security dilemma.

### Collective Action Problems

Civil war processes are also influenced by the collective action problems of asymmetries. Motivation asymmetry refers to an actor’s inadequate motivation to contribute to a collective action solution (Gibson et al. 2009, 35). Opposition groups contending with fractionalization also contend with different group interests. This could result in the lack of motivation to bring an end to hostilities. Motivation asymmetry also occurs where there is an asymmetric balance of power (Gibson et al. 2009, 40). For example, if an incumbent has clear military superiority, it is unlikely for the incumbent to concede politically or agree to negotiated terms.

Information asymmetry problems refer to missing information. Asymmetric information can stem from the lack of local knowledge or lack of information regarding an actor’s characteristics or intent (Gibson et al. 2009, 41). This asymmetry could result in Walter’s security dilemma regarding fear and credibility among political participants and their adherence to the terms of negotiated settlements. Asymmetric information could also lead to an intervening party aiding or supporting an unintended political group. For

example, in a rebel-controlled area where the population is the intended recipient of humanitarian assistance, the area is susceptible to infiltration by violent extremist individuals and organizations. This could result in the unintended support of radically-linked extremist organizations.

### Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies

#### Theory: Use of Statecraft

The previous four sections discussed intervention in terms of separate diplomatic, economic, and military efforts in intrastate conflicts. Chester Crocker discusses smart statecraft, essentially bringing to bear all soft power and hard power assets when formulating political strategies. He argues that smart statecraft leverages “wits, wallets, and muscle” into a political strategy spearheaded by agile diplomacy (Crocker 2005, 58). He urges the combination of soft power and hard power assets relative to level of coercion required to attain political outcome. In chapter 1 I briefly highlighted Nye’s coercion spectrum as an intervention consideration (see figure 4). Below are examples of diplomatic, economic, and military intervention efforts operating along Nye’s coercion spectrum (Nye 2007, 162).




Figure 4. Coercion Spectrum

Source: Joseph S. Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman Classics in Political Science, 2007), 162.

#### Theory: Transnational Theory

C. R. Mitchell developed a transnational theory of intervention based on two types of linkages—transactional and affective. Transactional linkages refer to political, economic, military, and educational interactions between groups in intervening state and target country. Affective refers to those linkages between ideological, religious, and ethnic groups. Mitchell argues that the characteristics of the intervening state, the characteristics of the country in conflict, and their transactional and affective linkages contribute to the decision to intervene.

Therefore, Mitchell puts forth a two-step analytical framework regarding when states choose to intervene. The first step involves the examination of the issues over which conflict occurs, the participants normally involved in such conflict, and when external parties are called to ally with a certain political participant. The second step examines under what “circumstances external parties are motivated to intervene” on

behalf of certain political participants (Mitchell 1970, 169). Based off his findings, he presents a contingency table of possible intervention situations regarding the intervening party's interests and place in the international system and the appeal for aid by an internal party within the disrupted state (see figure 5).

		INTERVENING PARTY IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM	
		Push to Defend Interests	No Push
INTERNAL PARTY IN DISRUPTED POLITICAL SYSTEM	Appeal for aid	INTERVENTION	?
	No Appeal	POSSIBLE INTERVENTION	NO INTERVENTION

Figure 5. Factors Leading to High Level, Formal Intervention

*Source:* C. R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (June 1970): 193.

### Theory: An Actor-Centric Approach

In a 2006 *Journal of Politics* article, Michael Findley and Tze Teo address why states intervene, when they decide to intervene, and with whom they align. In doing so, they introduce the concept of an actor-centric approach. Findley and Teo argue that the decision to intervene should focus primarily on the decision makers (actor-centric) and not solely on the conflict (phenomenon-centric). They argue that the phenomenon-

centric approach is appropriate when studying civil war termination, duration, and internal processes. On the other hand, the actor-centric approach should be used to analyze who decides to intervene, why they intervene, on whose behalf they chose to intervene, and whom they target (Findley and Teo 2006, 828). Similar to Mitchell's transactional and affective linkages, Findley and Teo focus on the relations and interests of potential interveners, actual interveners, and the disrupted state (Findley and Teo 2006, 830).

#### Theory: The Effectiveness of Official and Non-official Diplomacy

Tobias Bohmelt analyzes the effectiveness of diplomacy efforts by official actors and non-official actors. Official actors refer to state leaders, international leaders, or a representative of the two. Non-official actors refer to individuals or non-governmental organizations (Bohmelt 2010, 167). In his study, Bohmelt first analyzes the leverage and resources official and non-official actors have available. He then analyzes the leverage and resources invested. These two units of analyses are first done separately and then combined. He argues that the effectiveness of diplomacy is affected by the intervening party's leverage and resources (Bohmelt 2010, 176).

#### Theory: Outsider-Neutral, Insider-Partial

Coining the term insider-partial, Paul Wehr and John Lederach recommend that when considering mediation in civil conflicts, combine the advantages of the outsider-neutral with the advantages of the insider-partial. Wehr and Lederach's study analyzes externality and neutrality against internality and partiality. They find that an insider-partial's "connection within and knowledge of the conflict situation effectively



complements the objectivity and lack of connection of outsider-partials” (Wehr and Lederach 1991, 85). Ultimately, the authors push for mediation teams to include both outsider-neutrals and insider-partials (Wehr and Lederach 1991, 86).

Looking at externality and neutrality, outsider-neutrals maintain their distance from warring parties (Wehr and Lederach 1991, 85). Their connection to disputants is solely a function of their mediating role. An outsider-neutral’s neutrality in the mediation process creates the perception of legitimacy, credibility, fairness, and professionalism (see figure 6). Essentially, the outsider-neutral mediator remains objective throughout the mediation process. Outsider-neutrals are “not biased toward either side, have no investment in any outcome except settlement, and do not expect any special reward from either side” (Wehr and Lederach 1991, 86-87).




Figure 6. Neutrality-Based Model

*Source:* Paul Wehr and John P. Lederach, “Mediating Conflict in Central America,” *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (February 1991): 86.

Now, looking at internality and partiality, insider-partials heavily depend on acceptedness from and connectedness to disputants (see figure 7). Their internality to the conflict provides the intimate knowledge required and results in a vested interest toward a durable settlement. Additionally, insider-partials find it easier to gain the trust of conflict

participants. Trust plays a significant role as insider-partials are from within the conflict and must live with the consequences of the negotiated terms and return to live amongst conflictants.




Figure 7. Trust-Based Model

*Source:* Paul Wehr and John P. Lederach, “Mediating Conflict in Central America,” *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (February 1991): 88.

In a subsequent study, James Smith argues that impartiality plays a role based on the nature of a mediation. Smith identifies two types of mediation, power mediation and pure mediation. Smith finds that mediator impartiality is “less important in powered, coercive mediation (Smith 1994, 445). Disputants have little choice but to participate in mediations and accept the mediator’s terms. Conversely, in regards to pure mediation he finds impartiality vital to the success of private, non-coercive voluntary mediation. He argues that pure mediation must operate knowing that conflictants have volunteered to participate and may leave at any time (Smith 1994, 447).

#### Theory: Mediators and Resolution

Drawing on the outsider-neutral and insider-partial findings of Wehr and Lederach, Marie Olson and Frederick Pearson examine mediator type, rank (Regan et al.

2009), and conflict variables that affect conflict outcome. A conflict management attempt and its primary intent are the primary units of analysis.<sup>7</sup> Although they find that impartiality has some influence, they argue that “the ability to bring parties to an agreement is a result of repeated attempts in the presence of some form of external military force” (Olson and Pearson 2002, 421). The authors primarily focus on mediation, where the mediator meets with political participants in an effort to move the conflict toward a resolution.

#### Theory: Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity

As research as shown, conflicts that end in negotiated settlements often result in a recurrence of hostilities (Toft 2010; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008). Thus, recent civil war research has attempted to identify those factors affecting the sustainability of peace. DeRouen et al. explore the affect of state capacity and third-party intervention on the implementation of peace agreements.<sup>8</sup> The authors contend that level of state capacity and third-party intervention are factors of implementation success (DeRouen et al. 2010, 333).

First, the authors find stronger states require minimal third-party intervention and are better able to implement peace terms. When state capacity decreases third-party interventions are required to influence the conflict toward a peaceful outcome and to

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<sup>7</sup>“Conflict management attempt is defined as direct effort by a third party, or by parties to the conflict, to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means rather than violence or coercion” (Olson and Pearson 2002, 427).

<sup>8</sup>State capacity refers to the ability of the government to exercise effective authority in economic, political, and military matters during the transition period following a civil war (DeRouen et al. 2010, 333).

implement peace agreements. However, in a conflict where state capacity is very low, third-party intervention has minimal affect on conflict outcome and the implementation of negotiated terms (DeRouen et al. 2010, 344).

#### Theory: Sabotaging the Peace

In studying the politics of extremist violence, Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter highlight two trends of extremist violence. First, extremist violence is not as indiscriminate or irrational as assumed (Kydd and Walter 2002, 263). Second, extremists are surprisingly effective at disrupting or derailing peace processes. Addressing why extremists are able to sabotage peace processes and why the public opts to return to conflict, Kydd and Walter examine extremists' ability to foster mistrust between political participants implementing peace terms (Kydd and Walter 2002, 263). Their research focuses on three variables: the government being soft line or hard line, strength and trustworthiness of opposition moderates, and opposition extremists (Kydd and Walter 2002, 269). Kydd and Walter demonstrate that extremist organizations are rational and strategic. They argue that when mistrust is prevalent, when the government is hard line, and when opposition moderates fail to suppress terrorist violence, extremists are more likely to succeed in sabotaging peace processes (Kydd and Walter 2002, 289).

#### Theory: Securing the Peace

Toft examines those factors that contribute to the failure of negotiated settlements and peace agreements taking into account state capacity (DeRouen et al. 2010) and the level of mistrust between disputants (Kydd and Walter 2002). She examines the advantages and disadvantages of two conflict resolution types, military victory and

negotiated settlement. She also examines the initial period following the resolution and whether or not peace endures. Toft argues “that combining the strengths of each resolution type will make it possible to design an enduring and constructive settlement” (Toft 2010, 1).

### Summary

This chapter presented the dominant theories regarding third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts and although a wealth of information exists, the theories have yet to be integrated to allow for a cross-temporal and cross-sectional evaluation of an intervention strategy. In reviewing the literature, I have identified a trend which I will term ‘combination of efforts’. Combination of efforts can refer to combining diplomacy and mediation with economic efforts, combining official and non-official intervention efforts, or combining the advantages of different conflict outcomes. The intervention framework put forth in chapter 4 will convey this trend. In an attempt to transition easily into analysis, the order of the theories are aligned with the subcomponents of the framework.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an outline of the study's methodology. This study uses abductive reasoning, otherwise known as inference to the best explanation, to formulate a hypothesis regarding U.S. conflict management and resolution efforts and strategy. Ian Shapiro defines abductive reasoning as "reasoning on the basis of mature theories from observed effects to unobservable causes" (Shapiro 2005). It can also be explained as reasoning "from effect to cause" and as "the operation of adopting an explanatory hypothesis" (Niiniluoto 2014). Essentially, abduction consists of studying facts and observations and logically inferring and devising a theory to explain them (Frankfurt 1953).

Abductive reasoning is characterized by judgments made on whether an observation or experimental result "supports, disconfirms, or is irrelevant to a given hypothesis (Lipton 2000). Paul Thagard and Cameron Shelley state that central in its method, abductive reasoning and analysis is the goal of providing explanations of effects based on a studied set of causes. Thagard and Shelley further outline what abduction is and is not. Explanations are not deductions. Hypotheses are layered and may be revolutionary. Abduction may be visual, non-sentential, and may sometimes be creative (Thagard and Shelley 1997).

This research relied on interdisciplinary scholarship from intrastate and civil war research, the international relations and foreign policy fields, conflict management and resolution studies, and research conducted on past civil war intervention efforts. To provide a comprehensive literature review of third-party (external, foreign) intervention

in intrastate conflicts and civil wars, this study heavily depended on the research of reputable scholars and practitioners, and their cited sources, in the fields of conflict management, conflict resolution, and foreign intervention.

Patrick M. Regan provided a train of thought that focused on conditions that predict if, when, and why policymakers choose to intervene. Regarding civil war dynamics and barriers to conflict resolution, I relied on Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, Barbara Walter, and a Project on Middle East Political Science document. For post-conflict outcomes, I depended on Monica Duffy Toft, Barbara Walter, and Virginia Fortna. Supplemental to the abovementioned sources, I depended on a United States Institute of Peace book of collected works, *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. The book provided an extensive body of literature addressing diplomacy, various intervention efforts, and their effects. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate the utility of abductive reasoning and present an intervention framework that emphasizes the need to assess and re-evaluate intervention strategies over the course of a conflict.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

Conflict management, conflict resolution, and intervention in intrastate conflicts and civil wars will continue to be a significant aspect of domestic and international politics. The body of literature presented in chapter 2 provides the policy community, military practitioner, and unified action partner a variegated wealth of intervention considerations and variables. Yet, there does not exist a comprehensive theoretic framework that accounts for political considerations over the course of a civil war. The aim of this chapter is to present a framework that allows for the evaluation and re-evaluation of intervention efforts affected by civil war dynamics.

This framework consists of three temporal components: pre-intervention environment, conflict environment, and post conflict environment with similar evaluation criteria throughout. The framework posits ‘political considerations’ as the only cross-temporal evaluation criterion. I argue that this framework allows the analyst to visualize windows of opportunity for multi-sited interventions in a civil war.

Each environment (temporal component) includes the same three subcomponents—political aims and desired outcomes; conflict dynamics; and characteristics, motivations, and tendencies. With the exception of political considerations, each subcomponent addresses different elements of an intervention strategy (see figure 8). As noted in chapter 2, the literature revealed ‘combination of efforts’ as a common theme. This refers to combining intervention types, intervening actors, and the strengths of intervention outcomes. Thus, the analysis will portray combinations within each environment frame.



## Intervention Framework

Pre-Intervention Environment	Conflict Environment	Post Conflict Environment
<b>Political Aims and Desired Outcomes</b> <i>Political considerations</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Interests</li> <li>• Political costs and benefits</li> <li>• Intervention capabilities and opportunity</li> <li>• Political willingness and resolve</li> </ul> <i>Desired Conflict Outcome</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Durable peace conditions</li> </ul> <i>Type of Intervention</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Third-party intervention effects on civil war processes</li> <li>• Multilateral and combined efforts</li> </ul>	<b>Political Aims and Desired Outcomes</b> <i>Political considerations</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Interests</li> <li>• Political costs and benefits</li> <li>• Intervention capabilities and opportunity</li> <li>• Political willingness and resolve</li> </ul> <i>Desired Conflict Outcome</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional capacity</li> </ul>	<b>Political Aims and Desired Outcomes</b> <i>Political considerations</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Interests</li> <li>• Political costs and benefits</li> <li>• Intervention capabilities and opportunity</li> <li>• Political willingness and resolve</li> </ul> <i>Desired Conflict Outcome</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Durable peace conditions</li> </ul>
<b>Conflict Dynamics</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Underlying conflict issues</li> </ul>	<b>Conflict Dynamics</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict issues</li> </ul>	<b>Conflict Dynamics</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Justice and reconciliation</li> </ul>
<b>Characteristics, Motivations, &amp; Tendencies of Political Leadership</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Actor-centric approach</li> </ul>	<b>Characteristics, Motivations, &amp; Tendencies of Political Participants</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims, motivations, preferences, and ideologies of political participants</li> </ul>	<b>Characteristics, Motivations, &amp; Tendencies of Resolution Participants</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State capacity</li> <li>• Security apparatus</li> </ul>

Figure 8. Intervention Framework

*Source:* Created by author.

Figure 8 is the overall framework. I will address each framework environment and its subcomponents separately to discuss how their evaluative criteria contribute to the framework. The framework is intended to be used when deciding to intervene, when formulating an intervention strategy, and as a re-evaluation tool to assess an intervention strategy in terms of political considerations.

This framework has three potential flaws in framing each component, as each include assumptions. In both the pre-intervention environment and conflict environment components, the framework assumes understanding of the operational environment on behalf of the potential interveners. This includes critical factors leading to the conflict, potential polarizing issues to contend with, primary warring factions and their military capabilities, and other political, social, and geographic considerations. The post conflict

environment component includes the criterion, state capacity, as part of its last subcomponent. As a result of the conflict, it is assumed that the disrupted state's institutional capacity is weak or near non-existent and requires reconstruction and development.




Figure 9. Pre-Intervention Environment

*Source:* Created by author.

### Political Aims and Desired Outcomes

This subcomponent integrates Regan's two decision frameworks and Sullivan's study of the effects of military strength and resolve in order to provide comprehensive estimations of intervention capabilities and limitations (see figure 9). Therefore, Regan and Sullivan's research provide this subcomponent its first evaluation criterion, political considerations. Political considerations refer to domestic and international politics and their constraints. Also included are national security concerns, domestic and international audience considerations, human and material cost calculations, and evaluation of intervention capabilities available.

#### Political Considerations: National Interests

When considering intervention national interests play a significant role. As discussed in chapter 1, there are a number of reasons states decide to intervene. Most if not all interventions tend to portray strategic and political interests of the U.S. A significant aspect influencing U.S. national interests when deciding to intervene is the U.S. populace.

Domestically, the U.S. population would not expect a political leader to intervene if the intervention policies were expected to fail. Additionally, the longer the period of intervention, the higher the material and human costs tend to further influence domestic support. Therefore, Regan finds intervention strategies are based on three conditions: "(1) there is a reasonable expectation for success, (2) the projected time horizon for achieving the outcome is short, and (3) there is domestic support for the policy" (Regan 1998, 757). This leads to the next criterion, subjective estimates of political costs and benefits.

### Political Considerations: Political Costs and Benefits

The first decision theoretic framework addresses the issue of choosing to intervene or not. Finding that the decision to intervene is strongly influenced by domestic and international politics, Regan formulated a model that evaluates political considerations and the expected utility of intervention or non-intervention. The model yields subjective estimates of potential outcomes intended to maximize political benefits and minimize political costs. Political costs refer to the domestic and international ramifications as a result of intervention efforts.

Regan's framework of costs, expected utilities over outcomes, and estimates of likely intervention success (see figure 1) yield several results. First, multipartied interventions are easier to implement. Second, subjective estimates of likely outcome play a critical role in determining to intervene. Third, humanitarian issues matter. Regan highlights that massive dislocations pose moral, ethical, and resource dilemmas and draw the attention of policymakers. Fourth, although findings were inconclusive, Regan suggests factoring in geographic contiguity and its role in the level of foreign involvement (Regan 1998, 775-776).

### Political Considerations: Intervention Capabilities and Opportunity

The second decision theoretic framework addresses intervention policy options and focuses on the decision maker and the ability to substitute or change intervention policies. As chapter 2 highlights, this framework analyzes risks, capabilities, the opportunity to intervene, and the willingness of the leader to intervene. For the purposes of this framework, capabilities and opportunity are factored together. Willingness is factored with political resolve in the following section.

Once the decision has been made to intervene, policymakers focus their efforts on type of intervention. The type of intervention is based on available resources, the relative strength of U.S. assets (capabilities), and estimated vulnerabilities (risks). Regan suggests that the evaluation of political costs (Regan 1998) factors into the likelihood of decision makers substituting or changing policies (Regan 2000a, 99). Furthermore, Regan finds domestic political factors are more significant to intervention policy change than that of international political factors. Yet, the type of intervention implemented is more so influenced by international variables.

Examples of domestic variables include party politics and the role of the media. When a president faces a Congress held by the other party, he is less likely to change policies and vice versa. The role of the media affects intervention policies in that increased media coverage contributes to the perceptions of the public which in turn influences policy changes. As for international considerations, the type of intervention is affected by the number of other interveners, alliance commitments, and international media coverage (Regan 2000a, 102-103).

#### Political Considerations: Political Willingness and Resolve

This political consideration combines Regan's willingness to intervene with Sullivan's concept of resolve. Regan evaluates the willingness of a leader to intervene based on the calculated risks of an intervention type. The risks are associated with the political costs related to the expected success or failure of an intervention type (diplomacy, military, etc.) (Regan 2000a, 94). Sullivan measures resolve in terms of cost tolerance based on the estimated cost of victory.

Sullivan's research suggests that the more a political objective requires target compliance (coercive), the greater the impact of resolve (Sullivan 2007, 503-504). If the political objective requires target compliance, Sullivan finds strong states are more likely to underestimate the cost of victory. When the cost of victory is estimated too low or is acceptable, strong states are more likely to self-select in a conflict. On the other hand, if the actual costs exceed prewar expectations, the higher the likelihood the strong state will consider withdrawal (Sullivan 2007, 519-520).

Although Sullivan's argument pertains specifically to strong states going to war with weaker states, her findings are applicable to the decision to intervene in intrastate conflicts. Her theory "focuses on how the nature of a strong state's war aims affects the level of prewar uncertainty about the cost of attaining those objectives through the use of military force" (Sullivan 2007, 49). I argue that the nature of an actor's intervention aims affects the pre-intervention cost estimates of intervention options.

#### Desired Conflict Outcome: Durable Peace Conditions

Although there are a number of civil war outcomes, most fall within two categories, military victories<sup>9</sup> and some form of negotiated settlement.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, this framework refers to government military victory, opposition military victory, or negotiated settlements. Existing civil war literature has shown that military victories

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<sup>9</sup>Military victories are attained by rendering an opponent physically incapable of fighting (Sullivan 2009, 500).

<sup>10</sup>Negotiated settlements are attained by changing an opponent's belief about military victory or perceived costs (Regan 2009, 140).

shorten the duration of the conflict and lead to enduring peace. Yet, as Toft has highlighted, military victories result in weak quality of life institutions.

I echo Toft for this framework and argue that when considering a desired outcome, policymakers must examine those conditions that lead to a durable peace as a result of different outcomes. Military victories result in longer periods of peace due to the credible guarantee of punishing those who violate negotiated terms. Negotiated settlements result in better quality of life institutions and reconstruction and development provisions. This framework suggests assessing those conditions that lead to a durable settlement and combining the security of military victories with the benefits and promises of negotiated settlements.

#### Type of Intervention: Third-Party Intervention Effects

Policymakers have access to a wide range of intervention approaches and assets. As the literature has shown, third-party intervention matters and affects the duration of hostilities and the type of outcome in various ways. No one type of intervention effectively succeeded in shortening conflict duration, ending hostilities, or influencing a conflict toward desired outcome on its own. I argue that the type of intervention must consider third-party intervention effects presented in chapter 2 (see figure 10).

Overall	Third-Party (3P) Intervention Effects	Mediations	Economic Efforts	Military Interventions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unilateral interventions lengthen duration</li> <li>• Counterinterventions lengthen duration</li> <li>• Neutral interventions are less effective than biased interventions</li> <li>• Coercive methods of intervention are less effective than non-coercive efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the government shorten duration and increase the likelihood of government victory</li> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the government increase the risk of a negotiated settlement</li> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the government and the opposition lengthen duration</li> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the opposition decrease the likelihood of government victory</li> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the opposition increase the risk of an opposition victory</li> <li>• 3P interventions on behalf of the opposition increase the risk of a rapid negotiated settlement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most mediations result in a change of behavior of political participants</li> <li>• Mediations are effective when combined with other factors</li> <li>• Mediations are most effective when mediators are persistent, not representative of a small government, where foreign troops are present, and when the conflict is not characterized by identity issues</li> <li>• Combined mediations by official and non-official actors are more effective</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sanctions increase the likelihood of conflict termination</li> <li>• Sanctions imposed by an international organization increase likelihood of a negotiated settlement</li> <li>• Sanctions imposed unilaterally or by a small coalition of countries impact the probability of conflict termination militarily</li> <li>• Sanctions are more effective when target state is member of imposing institution</li> <li>• Total economic embargoes are the most effective measure to shorten duration, but have no affect on outcome</li> <li>• Multilateral arms embargoes decrease the likelihood of a military victory</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military intervention is ineffective on its own</li> <li>• Military interventions have little influence on quality of life issues and enduring peace</li> </ul>

Figure 10. Third-Party Intervention Effects

*Source:* Created by author.

In regards to diplomacy, Regan, Bohmelt, and Olson and Pearson all find mediations to be the most effective. However Regan recommends combining mediations with other intervention efforts. Bohmelt suggests combining the leverage and resources of official and non-official actors highlighting that non-official mediation efforts has the benefits of “pooled resources, decreased uncertainty, and the ensured support at the grassroots level” (Bohmelt 2012, 176).

Olson and Pearson’s research indicates that regional mediators are more effective in their attempts when combined with other factors (Olson and Pearson 2002, 433). The find that mediation is more successful when the mediator is persistent. Persistent



mediators are more successful when foreign troops are present. The chance of mediation success significantly increases if foreign troops are present and the mediator is persistent and not representative of a small government. Furthermore, in an environment where these factors are then combined with a conflict not characterized by identity issues, the prospects for successful resolution of some issues are greatest (Olson and Pearson 2002, 231-232).

As noted in figure 10, Escribà-Folch finds that sanctions and their imposed duration increases the likelihood of conflict termination (Escribà-Folch 2010, 135). While economic sanctions are associated with shorter conflicts, results suggest that total economic embargoes against the target country are the most effective measures in reducing the length of civil wars. The type of intervener had minimal effect (Escribà-Folch 2010, 135).

Turning to civil war outcomes, Escribà-Folch finds that the type of intervener affects the type of conflict outcome, whether it be negotiated settlement or military victory. Data shows that sanctions imposed by an international organization significantly increase the probability of a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, unilaterally imposed sanctions or those imposed by a small coalition of countries “have important impacts on the probability of a civil war ending through military means” (Escribà-Folch 2010, 137). Although total arms embargoes shorten conflicts, Escribà-Folch finds no influence on type of outcome. However, he finds that multilateral arms embargoes affect the balance of power lessening the likelihood of military victory. A significant finding concerns the target state’s place in a system. Escribà-Folch argues that economic

sanctions are more effective when the target state is a member of the imposing institution (Escribà-Folch 2010, 139).

#### Type of Intervention: Multilateral and Combined Efforts

Following the findings of the previous section, multilateral and combined intervention efforts are the most effective. Regan identifies the trend toward multilateralism and its legitimacy. Crocker and Nye suggest combining low coercive methods with high coercive methods through simultaneous diplomatic, economic, and military intervention efforts.

Crocker contends that smart statecraft understands the potential as well as the limits of military force. Therefore, military efforts need to be combined with smart power assets in political, economic, and social institutions. Such institutions include regional and international alliance structures. The use of civil society linkages (Mitchell 1970), expert knowledge of local and regional politics and cultures, assistance and training resources, and security institutions also contribute to smart statecraft (Crocker 2005, 59). Although Crocker advocates for statecraft in regards to the global war on terror, his concept is applied to this framework.

Wehr and Leederach recommend combining the objectivity of an outsider-neutral with the trust and knowledge of an insider-partial when building mediation teams. Bohmelt recommends combining the leverage and resources of official and non-official intervention efforts. Thus, the framework's multilateral and combined efforts criterion accounts for these findings.

### Conflict Dynamics: Underlying Conflict Issues

To intervene in a civil war one must analyze its open systems, macro and micro cleavages, major actors, and environmental variables to better understand the operational environment. However, while understanding the operational environment is integral to intervention strategies, I account for it as an assumption of the framework. Thus, conflict issues specifically refer to why the conflict began, who were the primary conflictants, and polarizing issues that could potentially arise due to the conflict.

Issues can range from land disputes to power disputes to the distribution of resources. Although ethnicity has been shown as an insignificant factor to civil war processes (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75; Bohmelt 2010, 175), Fortna, Olson, and Pearson have suggested otherwise. They find that civil wars characterized by identity issues are much more difficult to resolve and are more likely to result in renewed conflicts. Therefore conflict issues can include those stemming from identity. Additionally, intervention strategies must account for conflict issues identified at multiple levels.

### Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Political Leadership

For the pre-intervention environment I will build off Findley and Teo's actor-centric approach. Their approach called for the analysis of three relational dynamics: relations and interests between potential and actual interveners, relations and interests between intervening state and target state's government, and structural interests<sup>11</sup> in a target state (Findley and Teo 2006, 830).

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<sup>11</sup>Findley and Teo identify three sets of structural factors: "(1) fixed characteristics of the outside state that affect the probability it will intervene, (2) fixed characteristics of the conflict that also influenced the probability of intervention, and

Their study renders multiple findings. First, when a rival state has already intervened on behalf of the government, intervening on the behalf of the opposition is hastened. Second, when an ally has intervened on the side of the government, intervention on behalf of the government is highly likely. Finally, when a potential intervener is allied with target state, the likelihood for intervention increases. Conversely, when target state is a rival, potential interveners calculate the probability of success of intervening on behalf of the opposition (Findley and Teo 2006, 834-836).

For the purposes of this framework, I am adding Mitchell's transnational theory as a fourth and fifth dynamic. The fourth dynamic analyzes transactional and affective linkages between the intervening state and target state, as defined by Mitchell. Mitchell finds that a third party's initial involvement on behalf of a warring domestic participant is a result of existing linkages in various political, social, and economic systems (Mitchell 1970, 192). However, the fifth dynamic uses the concept of transnational theory and instead analyzes the transactional and affective linkages between other potential interveners and target state. This will provide interveners with an understanding of the conflict's alliance structure, which has been identified as a power asset of smart statecraft (Crocker 2005).

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(3) changing conditions of the conflict that affect the timing of interventions" (Findley and Teo 2006, 832).




Figure 11. Conflict Environment

*Source:* Created by author.

### Political Aims and Desired Outcomes

#### Political Considerations

As I have state earlier, there is one criterion that exists within each framework environment. I am using political considerations in each framework environment to prompt policymakers and military practitioners to assess or re-evaluate an intervention strategy over the course of a civil war. This also provides the opportunity to address previous estimates and calculations that, based on civil war dynamics, were proven to be too low, too high, or impractical.

### Desired Conflict Outcome: Institutional Capacity

Although not directly covered in the literature review, intervention strategies must address governance, security, and basic needs institutions over the course of the conflict in order to set the conditions for post conflict transition. It is expected that persistent intervention efforts addressing institutional capacity will increase the likelihood of a sustainable peace. It is also expected that institution building will directly affect the subcomponents of the post conflict environment.

### Conflict Dynamics: Conflict Issues

Similar to the pre-intervention environment regarding conflict issues, understanding civil war dynamics and its processes is integral to the effectiveness of intervention efforts. However, although civil war dynamics and barriers to resolution affect intervention efforts, understanding of the operational environment is assumed. Therefore, the framework assumes the intervener has an understanding of the conflict that includes those factors that preclude effective intervention.

Also in line with the pre-intervention environment's requirement to address conflict issues, analysis is required at all levels—local, district, municipal, and national government. However, additional analysis is required for disputes that have erupted as a result of the conflict itself. This can include issues resulting from the redistribution of resources and power, ideological differences in short-term and long-term goals, or foreign intervention efforts or meddling. This also refers to disputes as a result of opposition infighting and fractionalization.

### Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Political Participants

This subcomponent combines Regan's concept of structural changes, Werner's findings on bargaining leverage and original aims, and Kydd and Walter's concept of level of mistrust between participants. It also examines the motivation and information asymmetries that preclude collective action. I argue that these factors combined address the aims, motivations, preferences, and ideologies of political participants. The combination of efforts must examine relations between political participants and warring factions, their known preferences, and their original aims at the onset of the war. Original aims refer to the aim of total objectives versus limited objectives and whether or not the objectives are of high stakes or low stakes (Werner 1998, 321).

First, intervention efforts must address the relationships between political participants to better understand what perceptions are held regarding others' preferences and capabilities. Second, understanding the preferences and capabilities of political participants leads to an understanding of their original aims and the likelihood of bargaining. Werner contends if the original aims of a belligerent are limited, wars end in moderate settlements.

On the other hand, wars that end in punitive settlements are a result of the winner's original aims being total objectives. Simply put, settlement terms differ because original aims differ (Werner 1998, 321, 323). Additionally, when stakes are high, the duration of the conflict increases. Conversely, the duration of conflict shortens when stakes cannot justify endured costs (Werner 1998, 324). Lastly, when there is an understanding of preferences, capabilities, and original aims, interveners and state

stakeholders can begin to work toward building an acceptable level of trust between political participants.




Figure 12. Post Conflict Environment

*Source:* Created by author.

### Political Aims and Desired Outcomes

#### Political Considerations

Again, as with the conflict environment, the political considerations criterion provides an opportunity for policymakers to assess the effectiveness of an intervention strategy when transitioning to a post-conflict environment. A re-evaluation of political



considerations will also provide policymakers with the information to consider post conflict intervention options.

#### Desired Conflict Outcome: Durable Peace Conditions

As the literature has shown, most well-meaning third-parties operate under the assumption that warring parties prefer the benefits and provisions of a negotiated settlement. The thought also exists that a negotiated settlement will lead to an enduring and constructive peace settlement (Toft 2010, 2). Toft finds that durable peace conditions exist in both military victories and negotiated settlements.

Negotiated settlements tend to result in the benefits of redistributed power and resources, the likelihood of increased political participation, and the promise of reconstruction and development efforts. However, Toft also finds that negotiated settlements tend to result in renewed conflicts. She credits this disadvantage to negotiated settlements' lack of a credible guarantee to punish those who violate settlement terms (Toft 2010, 3-4).

In regards to military victories, her research suggests that military victories result in enduring peace, provided the defeated recognizes it as such. Additionally, opposition military victories tend to be more stable than government military victories. However, military victories struggle with weak quality of life institutions.<sup>12</sup> Of significance, Toft finds that an advantage of military victories is the ability of the victor to punish the loser (Toft 2010, 3).

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<sup>12</sup>Quality of life "includes factors such as basic human rights, political liberties, and prospects for economic survival and prosperity" (Toft 2010, 3).

Therefore, in combining the advantages of military victories and negotiated settlements, Toft introduces the theory of mutual benefits, mutual harm. Essentially, mutual benefits refer to those benefits as a result of negotiated settlements. This includes peace, redistribution of power, or development and reconstruction provisions. Mutual harm refers to the strength of military victories guaranteeing harm or punishment to political participants who reject, betray, or renege on post conflict agreement terms (Toft 2010, 2).

#### Conflict Dynamics: Justice and Reconciliation

Understanding that a transitional government will face a daunting period of political fragility, many suggest addressing the formation of certain institutions during and immediately following the end of conflict hostilities. Civil wars are often associated with large numbers of the population being subjected to mass atrocities and human rights violations (Ziadeh 2014, 95, 97). Thus, a justice and reconciliation program is required post conflict to support victims of the conflict. This criterion is associated with state capacity addressed in a later section.

Radwan Ziadeh recommends the immediate establishment and implementation of transitional justice processes at multiple levels of society. He recommends that such an institution focus on five objectives: (1) fact-finding and commissions of inquiry on war crimes and crimes against humanity; (2) filing lawsuits targeting the higher ranks of the regime and other known perpetrators; (3) compensation to victims to preserve their dignity and to ensure justice; (4) reformation of its institutions, laws, and policies to achieve long-term social, economic, and political sustainability; and (5) memorialization

intended to preserve the past and commemorate the survivors and victims (Ziadeh 2014, 98-105).

### Characteristics, Motivations, and Tendencies of Resolution Participants

Looking specifically at those responsible for the implementation and durability of peace agreements, I turn to DeRouen and Bercovitch's findings on the significance of state capacity and Toft's findings regarding the ability to punish violators. Additionally, I use Fortna's peacekeeping findings and Mitchell's intervention on behalf of disrupted state theory to support state capacity. I use Kydd and Walter's concept of trust to support security apparatus.

#### State Capacity

It is assumed that a level of institutional capacity has been reached as a result of intervention efforts in the conflict environment. As stronger states require minimal third-party intervention, this framework assumes weakened state capacity. Therefore, intervention strategies must address the state's capacity to implement peace agreements. This can be done through third-party peacekeeping efforts, as Fortna has found them to be effective in maintaining peace and preventing recurrent fighting. Mitchell's research suggests that when a state's institutional capacity is weakened, based on relations and interests, external parties are motivated to intervene.

#### Security Apparatus

Toft shows that the lack of ability to punish settlement defectors is a key factor as to why negotiated settlements result in renewed conflict. This is in line with Regan's finding regarding neutral policies being incapable of influencing civil war conditions, as

negotiated settlements tend to be impartial. Regan vies for a biased enforcing agency to effectively influence durable conditions (Regan 2002). Through her mutual benefits, mutual harm concept, Toft recommends negotiated settlements be implemented with security provisions through a security apparatus established specifically for the settlement itself or a security apparatus as part of the state.

The security apparatus can also be used to address security dilemmas and levels of mistrust. Kydd and Walter highlight uncertainty and level of mistrust as factors often linked to failed negotiation settlements. Therefore, a security apparatus could be used to mitigate uncertainty and mistrust. If a security apparatus is weak or in development, Kydd and Walter find third-party intervention crucial to peace durability. In effect international actors can act as third-party mediators and provide information to the government and population regarding the opposition's strength and trustworthiness. Additionally, international actors can offer to act as third-party monitors to negotiated terms (Kydd and Walter 2002, 289-290).

### Summary

The intervention framework presented is intended for policy and decision makers responsible for the formulation and implementation of intervention strategies. This includes military practitioners and unified action partners. The framework presented three temporal components to allow for analysis over the course of a civil war—pre-intervention, conflict, and post conflict. The political considerations criterion is cross-temporal and to be used throughout an intervention strategy. As civil wars tend to be prolonged, I argue that political considerations need to be assessed and re-assessed

throughout its implementation. Therefore, the framework is intended to provide windows of opportunity to alter an approach when conditions warrant.

As I have indicated, the framework assumes three factors significant to intervention effectiveness. The framework assumes understanding of the operational environment prior to intervention. Also, the framework assumes situational understanding of conflict dynamics on behalf of the intervener. Lastly, the framework assumes a weakened level of state capacity post conflict.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

This thesis focused on third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts. The conflict theories presented in this paper discussed variables affecting intervention decisions, types of intervention efforts most effective, effects of third-party involvement on the duration and outcome of civil wars, and the durability of post conflict settlements. A gap remained however, in that the findings are applicable to certain time frames—pre-intervention, conflict, and post-conflict.

The aim of this study was to integrate conflict intervention scholarship into an evaluative framework to assess the effectiveness of an intervention strategy over the course of an intrastate conflict. The research identified three aggregate concepts that were used to formulate the framework—political aims and desired outcomes; conflict dynamics; and characteristics, motivations, and tendencies. These three aggregated concepts were then placed in three temporal frames—pre-intervention, conflict, and post conflict. As a result of the research, political considerations are positioned in each frame to urge evaluation of intervention strategy during implementation and assess the effects of civil war dynamics. A key underpinning of the framework is the concept of combining efforts.

#### Recommendations

Recommend furthering this study by testing the efficacy of the framework against different intervention case studies. First to test the pre-intervention environment, the

framework can be tested using insecure environments<sup>13</sup> or against past interventions. Second, to test the conflict environment, the framework can be tested using historical interventions. On the other hand, to assess the re-evaluation criteria of political considerations, the conflict environment can be tested using an ongoing conflict specifically testing whether or not the framework allows for the re-evaluation of political considerations. However, this would be a very timely test. Lastly, to test the post-conflict environment, I recommend the framework will need to be tested against past conflicts and ongoing conflicts that appear to be on the verge of reaching an outcome. I do not suggest testing the post conflict environment against past interventions as they do not appear to combine the strengths and advantages of multiple outcomes.

#### Opportunity for Future Research

An opportunity for further research regards the characterization of a conflict and its polarizing issue(s), specifically identity. Findings regarding identity and its effect on civil conflicts are mixed. James Fearon and David Laitin find ethnicity to have little influence on when states experience conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). Similarly, in a later study by Bohmelt, findings suggest that ethnicity is insignificant and has little to no influence on civil war processes. However, Elbadawi and Sambanis find ethnic fragmentation is associated with a lengthened conflict. Moreover, as discussed earlier, Fortna, Olson, and Pearson find that conflicts characterized by identity issues are remarkably more difficult to resolve.

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<sup>13</sup>Crocker identifies insecure environments as “(1) those states undergoing profound political transformation; (2) intractable regional conflict patterns; and (3) regions featuring unresolved conflicts; and (4) states determined to resist encirclement, isolation, or abandonment” (Crocker 2007, 255).

For the military practitioner and unified action partner, an opportunity exists to examine the applicability of the political considerations criteria in military planning. If applicable, test the criteria as planning factors within the military decision making process. Lastly, I recommend testing the political considerations criteria within the ends, ways, and means structure and the operational approach methodology.



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